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positive and negative warnings. However, incorporating time-varying betas, event-in-
duced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity in the modelling process results in
post-negative-warning price patterns that are consistent with the predictions of the
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some post-positive-warning cumulative abnormal returns to disappear and their magni-
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1 Introduction
This study investigates the market reaction to profit warnings1 in the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange (HKEx). Empirical evidence on the price reaction to profit warnings is limited to
a few markets, such as the US, the UK and mainland China. Clare (2001) shows that
investors in the UK tend to overreact more to negative warnings than to positive ones.
Using Chinese data, Lui et al. (2009) find that stock prices overreact to the negative news
contained in profit warnings. Specifically, they report a significant price drop of about
-3% over the [-1, ?1] window and a significant price increase of 7.81% over the [?2,
?60] window around negative warnings. Consistent with the overreaction hypothesis,
Tucker (2004) documents that investors react more negatively to firms that warn, when
they anticipate negative earnings news, than those that do not warn. Jackson and Madura
(2003) examine stock price behavior around profit warnings containing negative news in
the US market. They find a significant price drop of -21.7% over the 11-day period ending
5 days after the announcement. However, they find no evidence of reversal after this period
and conclude that the market reaction to negative warnings is not excessive.
Previous studies on the stock price reaction to profit warnings are based on the standard
event study methodology, which ignores the potential impact of news on stock betas and
the residual variance (Brown et al. 1988; Corrado and Jordan 1997; Cyree and DeGennaro
2002; Lui et al. 2009; Savickas 2003; Zolotoy 2011; Cam and Ramiah 2014), a deficiency
that may hinder the testing of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).2 Specifically, if a
stock’s beta changes after the event date, the use of the pre-event beta may result in
inaccurate abnormal return estimates. Furthermore, several studies argue that ignoring the
heteroskedastic nature of volatility and event-induced variance will lead to biased market
model parameter estimates and inconsistent test statistics (e.g., Akgiray 1989; Corhay and
Tourani-Rad 1994).
It is widely documented in the literature that equity betas are not constant over time. For
example, Klemkosky and Martin (1975) and Bollerslev et al. (1988) argue that investors’
expected returns are conditional on the information available at any particular point in time
and their consistent reestimation of factor returns causes the betas of risky assets to vary
considerably over time. Consistent with this prediction, several studies find that estimated
betas exhibit statistically significant time variation (see, e.g., Harvey 1989; Ferson and
Korajczyk 1995; Faff et al. 2000). Many researchers also show that the variation in betas is
more pronounced around important news announcements. Zolotoy (2011), for instance,
argues that, as equity value tends to rise (fall) following the arrival of good (bad) news, the
weight attached to debt falls (rises). As such, the release of positive (negative) news
decreases (increases) the riskiness of equity investments. Similarly, Lui et al. (2009) find
that the systematic risk of individual stocks reacts asymmetrically to the positive and
negative news contained in the analyst reports. However, Brown et al. (1988) argue that, as
surprises increase uncertainty, stock betas should increase following both favourable and
unfavourable surprises. Specifically, they claim that investors tend to set prices before the
full ramifications of a dramatic financial event become known, and the arrival of news
immediately causes risk-averse investors to set stock prices significantly below their
conditional expected values. Using a sample of the 200 largest S&P firms over the period
1 Profit warnings are announcements made by publicly traded companies, prior to the issuance of their
formal financial reports, to warn investors that their earnings will differ from previously expected levels.
Profit warnings can be either positive or negative.
2 See Yen and Lee (2008) for a thorough review of the literature on efficiency market hypothesis.
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1962–1985, Brown et al. (1988) show that the variance of returns, the residual variance and
the coefficient of systematic risk exhibit significant increases following daily residual
returns in excess of 2.5 (sign ignored). Kalay and Lowenstein (1985) argue that, since
events convey information to the market, stock price volatility should also increase in the
post-announcement period. They also maintain that the incremental risk above that on a
random day may not be fully diversifiable. Using a sample of 302 US firms for the period
1962–1980, they show that stock betas exhibit a significant increase in the aftermath of
dividend announcements. More recently, Patton and Verardo (2012) propose a simple
learning model, which suggest that investors use firm-specific news to extract information
on the aggregate economy. They argue that since earnings are affected by both market-
wide and firm-specific conditions, investors can use earnings of the announcing firms to
revise their expectations about the profitability of other firms in the economy. This process
of learning across stocks is expected to drive up the comovement between announcing
stocks and other stocks and yield an increase in the market beta of the announcing stocks.
Consistent with the predictions of the learning model, Patton and Verardo show that the
betas of the constituents of the S&P 500 increase significantly around earnings
announcements, regardless of whether the news is good or bad.
The extant literature has recognised the importance of adjusting for stochastic volatility
around the event period. For example, Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the failure to
adjust for the event-induced variance may result in biased estimates of the traditional test
statistics, and that the power of these tests can be improved by appropriately modelling the
volatility process. To control for the event-induced variance, Boehmer et al. (1991) pro-
pose a statistical test, generated by first standardising event-period returns by the esti-
mation-period standard deviation and then dividing the cross-sectional mean of the
standardised returns by their cross-sectional standard deviation. Savickas (2003) argues
that a limitation of Boehmer et al.’s approach stems from the implicit assumption that the
event-induced variance is the same across all sample stocks. Brockett et al. (1999) model
the volatility process around the events using a market model with GARCH effects and
time-varying betas. However, their approach ignores the importance of event-induced
variance. Savickas (2003) addresses the conditional heteroskedastic behavior of volatility
and the event-induced residual variance in a single model. Nevertheless, his model ignores
the importance of time-varying betas, a phenomenon that may be particularly important
around dramatic financial events (see, e.g., Brown et al. 1988; Zolotoy 2011; Lui et al.
2009).
In this study, we investigate the market reaction to profit warnings using an event study
methodology that addresses the conditional heteroskedastic behavior of volatility, the time-
varying betas and the event-induced variance simultaneously. Our contribution to the
literature is twofold. First, we examine whether the nature of profit warnings affects a
stock’s beta. Brown et al. (1988) shows that stock betas increase following daily price
shocks (daily residual returns) of ±2.5% or more. However, we argue that large daily price
shocks may be caused by the behavior of noise traders rather than the arrival of news.
Thus, using profit warnings as the events provides a cleaner test of the impact of the arrival
of news on time-varying betas. Second, we propose an event study methodology that
adjusts the abnormal return estimates and statistical tests for the time-varying betas and the
event-induced residual variances as well as the conditionally heteroskedastic behavior of
volatility. Specifically, we improve on Savickas’ (2003) model by allowing the beta
parameter of the market model to vary over time, while adjusting for the event-induced
variance and conditional heteroskedasticity. We argue that this improvement is important
not only because a stock beta varies systematically over time, but also because its variation
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is likely to be more pronounced around news events (Brown et al. 1988; Zolotoy 2011; Lui
et al. 2009).
The results of our study can be summarised briefly as follows. Firstly, we observe the
highest positive (negative) abnormal returns on the day on which positive (negative)
warnings are released. We also report strong price reversal patterns following both positive
and negative warnings. Secondly, consistent with Brown et al.’s (1988) view that surprises
increase uncertainty, the average beta of event stocks increases significantly after both
positive and negative warnings. Thirdly, we show that the statistical significance of the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following negative warning announcements disap-
pears completely after we account for the time-varying betas. We also find that the time-
varying beta adjustments reduce the magnitude and the statistical significance of the price
reversal patterns following positive warnings. Fourthly, the average abnormal returns on
the first 2 days following warnings containing positive news lose their significance after the
event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity are accounted for, while the
subsequent CARs become much smaller. Finally, we show that adjusting for time-varying
betas, event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity simultaneously yields
even smaller post-positive-warning CARs. We argue that, although many of the post-
positive-warning CARs remain significant after the incorporation of time-varying betas,
event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity in the modelling process, these
patterns should not be used as evidence against the EMH for at least three reasons. First,
the results from the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions indicate that the post-
positive-warning CARs are not related to the abnormal returns on the announcement days.
This finding is not consistent with the prediction of the overreaction hypothesis, which
suggests that greater overreaction would lead to greater correction (see, e.g., Cox and
Peterson 1994; Choi and Jayaraman 2009). Second, the magnitude and the statistical
significance of the post-positive-warning CARs are highly sensitive to the way in which
abnormal returns are measured. Finally, incorporating time-varying betas, event-induced
variance and conditional heteroskedasticity into the modelling process yields post-positive-
warning CARs that are too small to cover the transaction costs that one would incur in
pursuing a contrarian strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset.
Section 3 presents the empirical tests and results. Section 4 provides some additional
results and robustness checks, and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Data
The statements of profit warnings used in this study are obtained from the HKEx website.
The exchange began publishing these statements in July 2007. Our initial sample includes
all such statements issued during the period from July 2007 to July 2012. Daily closing
prices of the issuing firms and the Hang Seng index are obtained from DataStream. Our
final sample constitutes a total of 1723 profit warnings, of which 1238 contain negative
news and 485 contain positive news about firms’ earnings prospects. The dominance of
warnings containing negative news in our sample may be attributed to the fact that only
bad news is emphasised in the ‘‘listing rules’’ in Hong Kong (see, e.g., Wang and Zhang
2011). Furthermore, several studies suggest that warnings are more likely to be issued prior
to negative than positive news (see, e.g., Barmber and Cheon 1998; Libby and Tan 1999;
Wang and Zhang 2011).
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3 Tests and results
To estimate the abnormal returns around profit warnings, we initially use the standard
event study methodology. Then, we relax the market model assumption that stock betas
and residual variance are constant over time and not affected by the arrival of news.
Specifically, we use a bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH model
to account for time-varying betas. Then, we employ a model developed by Savickas (2003)
to control for the effect of event-induced variance and the heteroskedastic behavior of
volatility on the abnormal return estimates. Finally, we improve on Savickas’ approach by
allowing stock betas to vary over time.
3.1 Standard event study
The approach most commonly used to estimate expected returns is the market model3:
Rit ¼/i þbiRmt þ eit; E eitð Þ ¼ 0; var eitð Þ ¼ r2i ; ð1Þ
where Ri,t and Rm,t are day t’s continuously compounded returns of stock i and the market
portfolio m, respectively; /i and bi are the parameters of the market model and eit is the
error term, which is assumed to have a zero mean and a constant variance, r2i . Equation (1)
is estimated over the [-200, -15] window prior to profit warnings. The abnormal return of
stock i on day t, or ARi,t, is then estimated as
ARit ¼ Rit  c/i þ bbiRmt
 
: ð2Þ
The price effect of profit warnings is measured using the daily average abnormal return
(ARt) and the cumulative average abnormal return (CARs). The average abnormal return on
day t is computed as
ARt ¼
PN
i¼1 ARi;t
N
: ð3Þ
The cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of S days starting one day
after the event is given as
CARis ¼
X
S
t¼1
ARit: ð4Þ
The average cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days beginning 1 day after
the event and across N stocks, is computed as
CARs ¼ 1
N
X
N
i¼1
CARis: ð5Þ
3 Dyckman et al. (1984) show that the market model performs significantly better than other models, such as
the index or average return models. Similarly, Armitage (1995: 25) argues that ‘‘…the market model is most
commonly used to generate expected returns and no better alternative has yet been found despite the weak
relationship between beta and actual returns…’’.
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Two test statistics, T1 and T2, are used to assess the statistical significance of ARt and
CARs, respectively, and are specified as follows:
T1 ¼ ARt
drAR

ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p and T2 ¼
CARs
drCAR

ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ; ð6Þ
where drAR and drCAR are the standard deviations of ARi,t and CARi,s, respectively, and are
estimated as
drAR ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N  1
X
N
i¼1
ARi;t  ARt
 2
v
u
u
t and drCAR ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N  1
X
N
i¼1
CARi;s  CARs
 2
v
u
u
t :
When standard assumptions hold, T1 and T2 follow Student t-distributions with N - 1
degrees of freedom.4
Table 1 reports the average daily ARs and the CARs around profit warnings. Panel A
reports the CARs following negative warnings. The average AR on the announcement date
is -3.46% and is highly significant (with a t-value of -16.73). The average CARs fol-
lowing the announcements of bad news are positive and significant, except for day 1, with
values increasing monotonically from 0.01% on day 1 to 1.25% for the [?1, ?10] window.
This finding indicates that, on average, an investor can earn a significant abnormal return of
1.25% by holding a stock for a period of 10 days starting 1 day after a negative warning.
Panel B presents the results on the price reaction to positive warnings. The average AR
on the announcement date is positive (with a value of 3.9%) and is statistically significant
at less than the 1% level. The average CARs following positive news are negative and
highly significant, indicating strong price reversal following the arrival of good news. This
finding suggests that, on average, an abnormal return of 2.82% can be earned by short
selling a stock 1 day after a positive warning and repurchasing it 10 days later. Our
evidence is similar to that of Lui et al. (2009), who find strong share price reversal
following negative warnings in the Chinese main market. Price reversal patterns are also
documented by several studies on the price reaction to shocks. For instance, Atkins and
Dyl (1990) report significantly negative (positive) average CARs from following the three
largest winners (losers) on 500 randomly selected trading days from 1975 to 1984. Bremer
and Sweeney (1991) examine stock price behavior following a 1-day price change of
-10% or less, and their results confirm the overreaction hypothesis.
We argue that one weakness of the existing literature on the stock price reaction to profit
warnings stems from the explicit assumption that the stock beta is constant over time and is
not affected by the arrival of news. In this study, we adopt the bivariate form of Engle and
Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH model to estimate time-varying systematic risk and the
conditional abnormal returns.
3.2 Time-varying betas
Following Tsui and Yu (1999), Choudhry (2005) and Choudhry et al. (2010), we use the
bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH to estimate the conditional
4 For robustness purposes, we also use Newey-West heteroskedasticity, the serial correlation consistent
estimator and the J-statistic of Campbell et al. (1997) and our conclusions remain unchanged. Details of
these results are available upon request.
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betas of the market model. Under this model, the conditional variance–covariance matrix is
specified as follows:
yt ¼ tþ Nt;NtjWt1 Nð0;HÞ; ð7Þ
Ht ¼ C0C þ A0Nt1N0t1Aþ B0Ht1B; ð8Þ
where yt ¼ Rit;Rm;t
 
is a 2 9 1 vector containing the continuously compounded returns of
stock i and the market portfolio m; t is a 2 9 1 vector of constants; Ht is a 2 9 2
conditional variance–covariance matrix, which depends on the elements of the information
set Wt1 of the past value of the error term Nt; C, A and B are 2 9 2 matrices of
parameters.
Engle and Kroner (1995) argue that the BEKK model is sufficiently general as it
includes all positive definite diagonal representations and nearly all positive definite vector
representations. It has also been suggested that the BEKK model addresses an important
Table 1 Price reaction to profit warnings: standard event study approach
Panel A: Negative warnings Panel B: Positive warnings
Value (%) t-statistic Value (%) t-statistic
AR0 -3.46*** -16.73 4.16*** 12.46
AR1 -0.01 0.04 -0.90*** -5.00
CAR 1;2½  0.41* 1.76 -1.27*** -4.68
CAR 1;3½  0.49* 1.89 -1.30*** -4.31
CAR 1;4½  0.55* 1.87 -1.43*** -4.30
CAR 1;5½  0.74** 2.22 -1.73*** -4.89
CAR 1;6½  0.90** 2.45 -1.98*** -5.04
CAR 1;7½  1.02*** 2.58 -2.15*** -5.10
CAR 1;8½  1.09*** 2.66 -2.40*** -5.51
CAR 1;9½  1.28*** 2.97 -2.71*** -5.99
CAR 1;10½  1.25*** 2.73 -2.82*** -5.87
N 1238 485
The abnormal return of stock i on day t, or ARi,t, is estimated using the parameters of the standard market
model over the [-200, -15] window prior to profit warnings. The price effect of profit warnings is
measured using the daily average abnormal return (ARt) and the cumulative average abnormal return
(CARs). The average abnormal return on day t is given by ARt ¼
PN
i¼1 ARi;t
N
The cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of S days starting 1 day after the event is given by
CARi;s ¼
P
S
t¼1
ARi;t
The average cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days beginning 1 day after the shock and across
N stocks is given by CARs ¼ 1N
P
N
i¼1
CARi;s
A standard t test is used to check the statistical significance of ARt and CARs
***, ** and * Significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively
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weakness of the general specification of the multivariate GARCH by ensuring that the Ht
matrix is always positive definite (see, e.g., Bollerslev et al. 1994).
Equations (7) and (8) are estimated separately for the [-201, -1] and [0, ?200]
windows around warning dates, and the time-varying beta of stock i (bi;tÞ is computed as
cbit ¼
h12;t
h22;t
; ð9Þ
where h12;t and h22;t are elements of the matrix Ht and are defined as the conditional
covariance between stock i’s returns and the market portfolio returns, and the conditional
variance of the market portfolio returns, respectively.
The standard paired t test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (WSRT)
are used to judge whether the average pre-warning beta, measured over the [-201, -1]
window prior to the announcement date, is significantly different from the average post-
warning beta, measured over a window of S days beginning 1 day after the event.
To account for the potential effect of changes in beta on the abnormal returns around
profit warnings, we estimate conditional beta-adjusted abnormal returns as follows5:
ARit ¼ Rit  bai þcbitRmt
 
: ð10Þ
The average conditional beta-adjusted average ARs and CARs are calculated using
Eqs. (2) and (5), respectively. The standard t test is also used to gauge their statistical
significance.
Table 2 reports the changes in conditional betas following profit warnings. Panel A
presents the changes in conditional betas following negative warnings. The mean (median)
pre-warning conditional beta is 0.609 (0.579). The results suggest that the post-warning
betas are higher than the pre-warning betas, across all post-event windows. Both the paired
t test and the WSRT suggest that the difference between the pre- and post-warning betas is
statistically significant. Panel B presents the conditional betas around positive warnings.
The mean (median) conditional beta over the [-201, -1] window prior to warnings
containing positive news is 0.679 (0.685). Both the paired t test and the WSRT indicate
that stock betas increase significantly following the arrival of positive news.
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the presence of a structural break in average daily betas
following both positive and negative warning announcements. Specifically, the fig-
ures show that betas are relatively stable before warning announcements, increase sub-
stantially on the announcement dates and stabilise thereafter. In contrast to Patton and
Verardo (2012), our results suggest that betas do not revert back to the pre-announcement
average over the 10-day window following warning announcements.
We conduct two additional tests to investigate whether the changes in betas are indeed
caused by the arrival of news. First, for each event stock, we select a date randomly from
its pre-warning window. We treat the randomly selected dates as if they were the event
dates. The paired t test and WSRT suggest that the changes in beta following these
pretended event dates are not significantly different from zero (the table is omitted to
conserve space). Second, we match event stock with another stock from the same industry,
with the closest market capitalization and with no price sensitive news within the [-10,
?10] window around the warning announcement dates. In untabulated results, we find that
the changes in the betas of the control stocks around the warning events are not
5 The parameter ais generated by regressing the variable ðRi;t  bi;tRm;tÞ against a constant term.
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significantly different from zero, implying that the increase in the post-warning betas is
more likely to be caused by the arrival of news than the systematic time-varying nature of
stock betas. This evidence is consistent with Kalay and Lowenstein (1985), Brown et al.
(1988) and Patton and Verardo (2012), who show that, as surprises increase uncertainty,
systematic risk increases significantly in the aftermath of both positive and negative news.
Hence, ignoring the time-varying nature of the betas may result in biased abnormal return
estimates.
Table 3 reports the conditional beta-adjusted average ARs and conditional beta-adjusted
average CARs following the release of profit warnings. Panel A focuses on the negative
warnings. Our results indicate that the post-warning CARs carry a positive sign. However,
none of these post-warning CARs is significantly different from zero. This evidence
indicates that individual stocks in Hong Kong react efficiently to the negative news con-
tained in profit warnings. Both the paired t test and WSRT suggest that the values of time-
varying-beta-adjusted CARs are significantly smaller than their corresponding market
model CARs in Table 1. Panel B also presents the conditional beta-adjusted average ARs
Table 2 Conditional betas fol-
lowing profit warnings
We use the bivariate form of
Engle and Kroner’s (1995)
BEKK GARCH model to
estimate the conditional betas.
The model is estimated
separately for the [-201, -1]
and [0, ?200] windows around
announcement dates. The
standard paired t test and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank
test (WSRT) are used to judge
whether the average pre-warning
announcement beta, measured
over the [-201, -1] window
prior to the announcement date,
is significantly different from the
average post-warning beta,
measured over a window of
S days beginning 1 day after the
event
***, ** and * Significance at 1, 5
and 10%, respectively
Mean t-statistic Median t-statistic
Panel A: Conditional betas around negative warnings
b 201;1½  0.609 0.579
b 0;þ1½  0.655*** 4.14 0.625*** 4.30
b 0;þ2½  0.654*** 3.98 0.623*** 4.14
b 0;þ3½  0.653*** 3.88 0.623*** 4.17
b 0;þ4½  0.652*** 3.61 0.622*** 4.12
b 0;þ5½  0.652*** 3.69 0.622*** 4.12
b 0;þ6½  0.652*** 3.74 0.619*** 4.08
b 0;þ7½  0.652*** 3.78 0.619*** 4.08
b 0;þ8½  0.653*** 3.82 0.619*** 4.08
b 0;þ9½  0.653*** 3.89 0.619*** 4.10
b 0;þ10½  0.654*** 3.93 0.617*** 4.11
N 1238
Panel B: Conditional betas around positive warnings
b 201;1½  0.679 0.685
b 0;þ1½  0.729*** 2.93 0.707*** 2.96
b 0;þ2½  0.726*** 2.76 0.707*** 2.86
b 0;þ3½  0.727*** 2.78 0.709*** 2.86
b 0;þ4½  0.728*** 2.88 0.709*** 2.93
b 0;þ5½  0.728*** 2.89 0.709*** 2.90
b 0;þ6½  0.728*** 2.88 0.711*** 2.88
b 0;þ7½  0.728*** 2.90 0.711*** 2.90
b 0;þ8½  0.728*** 2.89 0.711*** 2.89
b 0;þ9½  0.728*** 2.90 0.711*** 2.91
b 0;þ10½  0.729*** 2.93 0.711*** 2.94
N 485
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and CARs following positive warnings. Stock prices respond positively to the arrival of
good news. The average conditional beta-adjusted abnormal return on the announcement
date is 4.11%. This figure is statistically significant at less than the 1% level. All post-
warning conditional beta-adjusted CARs are significantly negative, ranging from
CAR1 = -0.67% to CAR9 = -1.27%. Both the standard t test and the WSRT indicate a
significant decline in the values of post-positive-warning CARs following time-varying
beta adjustment.
In short, the findings in this section suggest that the price reversal patterns following
negative profit warnings are more likely to be the outcome of model misspecification than
investors’ overreaction. However, while the negative CARs following positive warnings
Fig. 1 Changes in beta around positive warnings
Fig. 2 Changes in beta around negative warnings
S. Yin et al.
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Table 3 Price reaction to profit warnings: The conditional market model approach
Conditional versus unconditional
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score
Panel A: Negative warnings
AR0 -3.54 -16.14*** -4.97*** -5.49***
AR1 -0.16 -0.92 -4.73*** -4.82***
CAR 1;2½  0.04 0.18 -6.52*** -5.80***
CAR 1;3½  -0.02 -0.07 -8.27*** -7.15***
CAR 1;4½  -0.03 -0.10 -8.14*** -7.25***
CAR 1;5½  -0.01 -0.04 -8.68*** -7.76***
CAR 1;6½  0.01 0.03 -8.60*** -7.81***
CAR 1;7½  -0.06 -0.18 -8.74*** -7.92***
CAR 1;8½  -0.16 -0.44 -8.97*** -8.18***
CAR 1;9½  -0.17 -0.44 -9.27*** -8.39***
CAR 1;10½  -0.32 -0.79 -9.05*** -8.08***
N 1238
Panel B: Positive warnings
AR0 4.11 12.87*** 4.43*** 5.73***
AR1 -0.67 -3.96*** 5.59*** 5.68***
CAR 1;2½  -0.75 -3.10*** 7.20*** 7.21***
CAR 1;3½  -0.67 -2.37*** 7.76*** 8.15***
CAR 1;4½  -0.67 -2.23*** 7.79*** 7.89***
CAR 1;5½  -0.85 -2.60*** 7.41*** 8.29***
CAR 1;6½  -0.97 -2.70*** 8.12*** 8.24***
CAR 1;7½  -1.05 -2.73*** 8.44*** 8.51***
CAR 1;8½  -1.12 -2.80*** 8.31*** 8.43***
CAR 1;9½  -1.27 -3.06*** 8.14*** 8.35***
CAR 1;10½  -1.19 -2.73*** 8.11*** 8.38***
N 485
To account for the potential effect of changes in beta on the abnormal returns around profit warnings, we
estimate conditional beta-adjusted abnormal returns, ARci;t, as follows: ARi;t ¼ Ri;t  c/h þ cbi;t Rm;t
 
where bi;t is a time-varying beta estimated using the bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK
GARCH model, which is estimated separately for the [-201, -1] and [0, ?200] windows around the
announcement dates. The average conditional beta-adjusted abnormal returns, ARct , are calculated by
ARt ¼
PN
i¼1 ARi;t
N
The time-varying beta-adjusted cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of S days starting 1
day after the event is given by CARi;s ¼
PS
t¼1 ARi;t
The average time-varying beta-adjusted cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days beginning 1
day after the shock and across N stocks is computed by CARs ¼ 1N
PN
i¼1 CARi;s
The standard t test is used to assess the statistical significance of the price effect
***, ** and * Significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively
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become small in magnitude, they remain highly significant even after the systematic
variations in stock betas are accounted for.
3.3 Conditional heteroskedasticity and event-induced variance
As discussed earlier, the extant literature suggests that accounting for the conditionally
heteroskedastic behavior of volatility and event-induced variance improves the market
model parameter estimates and the power of the statistical tests. Following Savickas
(2003), we estimate the abnormal returns as follows:
Rit ¼ ai þ bitRmt þ cinDin þ eit; eitjXit1 N 0; h2it
 
h2it ¼ ui þ wih2it1 þ hie2it1 þ /inDin

ð11Þ
where eit in Eq. (11) is a residual term, with mean of zero and time-varying variance h2it
assumed to follow a GARCH (1,1) process.6 The subscript n 2 1;þN½  of the variable Din
denotes the number of days after the event day t. Di1, Di2, …, DiN are dummy variables
with a value of unity if t 2 0;þ1½ , t 2 0;þ2½ , …, t 2 0;þN½ , respectively, and zero
otherwise. bin is the change in the systematic risk measured over the window of length
n after the profit warning. The rest of the variables are as defined previously. The parameter
cin in Eq. (11) reflects the abnormal returns around the event and the parameter /in in
Eq. (11) captures the event-induced residual variance.
Savickas (2003) argues that the increase in variance around events may result in the
misspecification of the traditional test statistics, and proposes the following test to account
for the stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-event periods:
test ¼
X
N
i¼1
Sit
N
=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N N  1ð Þ
X
N
i¼1
Si;t 
X
N
j¼1
Sj;t=N
 !2
v
u
u
t ð12Þ
where
Sit ¼ cinﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ch2in
q
wherecin is the estimatedmean abnormal return of security i on a given day orwindowand
ch2in
is the estimated standard deviation of the abnormal return on a given day (we use the average
of ch2it when abnormal returns are estimated over a window). The test statistic presented in
Eq. (12) follows the Student t-distribution with N - 1 degrees of freedom. Savickas argues
that his test has more power as it allows the event-induced volatility effect to differ across
securities and each security’s variance to be stochastic outside the event period.
Table 4 presents the abnormal return estimates obtained using Savickas’ (2003)
approach. Panel A shows that the abnormal returns following negative warnings are small
and not significantly different from zero. The paired t test suggests that, except on day 1,
the CARs from Savickas’ model are significantly smaller than the CARs obtained using the
standard event methodology approach (see Panel A of Table 1). The WSRT also indicates
that the difference between the ARs and CARs from Savickas’ approach and the market
model are significant for days 0 and ?1 and for the window [?1, ?9] after the negative
6 The results from GJR-GARCH (1,1) and E-GARCH (1,1) are very similar to those reported here. Further
details are available upon request.
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Table 4 Price reaction to profit warnings: the role of event-induced variance and conditional
heteroskedasticity
Conditional versus unconditional
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score
Panel A: Negative warnings
AR0 -3.48 -7.66*** 0.18 4.93***
AR1 0.00 -0.50 0.01 2.19**
CAR 1;2½  0.03 -1.16 1.89* 0.94
CAR 1;3½  -0.04 -1.30 2.49** 1.30
CAR 1;4½  -0.10 -0.28 2.55** 0.75
CAR 1;5½  0.02 -0.78 2.61*** 1.32
CAR 1;6½  0.12 0.87 2.48** 0.88
CAR 1;7½  0.22 0.11 2.25** 1.31
CAR 1;8½  0.10 0.33 2.64*** 1.04
CAR 1;9½  0.04 0.10 3.21*** 1.97**
CAR 1;10½  0.14 0.95 2.62*** 1.52
N 1238
Conditional versus unconditional
Mean (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score
Panel B: Positive warnings
AR0 3.92 4.26*** -0.06 -4.05***
AR1 -0.85 -1.27 0.14 -4.76***
CAR 1;2½  -0.39 -1.33 -5.13*** -6.13***
CAR 1;3½  -0.27 -2.31** -4.76*** -6.05***
CAR 1;4½  -0.19 -2.96*** -4.67*** -5.06***
CAR 1;5½  -0.15 -2.33** -5.34*** -5.73***
CAR 1;6½  -0.25 -4.04*** -5.20*** -6.28***
CAR 1;7½  -0.14 -3.71*** -5.39*** -6.39***
CAR 1;8½  -0.17 -3.74*** -5.78*** -6.54***
CAR 1;9½  -0.18 -3.26*** -6.22*** -6.86***
CAR 1;10½  -0.17 -3.72*** -6.01*** -6.72***
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warning. The ARs and CARs reported in Panel A are also smaller than their time-varying-
beta-adjusted counterparts (see Panel A of Table 3). Overall, the results in Panel A are
consistent with the predictions of the EMH, which posits that stock prices adjust instantly
and accurately to the arrival of news.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the average ARs and CARs from Savickas’ model,
following positive warnings, are negative but much smaller than those from the standard
market model (Panel B of Table 1) and from the market model with time-varying beta
(Panel B of Table 3). The AR1 and CAR2 after warnings containing positive news are not
significantly different from zero. The subsequent CARs are significantly negative, but
small in magnitude, ranging from -0.27% (CAR3) to -0.14% (CAR7). While the
abnormal returns immediately after the events are not significant, the results suggest that,
on average, short selling a stock immediately after a positive news announcement and
repurchasing it 10 days later would generate a return of 0.17%. However, the average
(median) relative bid-ask spread associated with our sample stocks during the study period
is 3.06% (1.92%). Thus, such price patterns may not yield profits in excess of transaction
costs and therefore cannot be used as evidence against the EMH.
3.4 Conditional heteroskedasticity, event-induced variance and time-varying
betas
Savickas (2003) explicitly assumes that stock betas are constant over time and not affected
by the arrival of news. To address this potential limitation, we replace the constant bi
parameter in Eq. (11) with the time-varying betas generated by the BEKK GARCH model.
We argue that allowing betas to be stochastic both within and outside of the event period
should yield more accurate estimates of the abnormal return and residual variance and
Table 4 continued
Conditional versus unconditional
Mean (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score
N 485
We use Savickas’ (2003) model to estimate the abnormal returns
Rit ¼ ai þ bitRmt þ cinDin þ eit; eitjXit1  N 0; h2it
 
h2it ¼ ui þ wih2it1 þ hie2it1 þ /inDin

where eit is a residual term, with a mean of zero and a time-varying variance h2it assumed to follow a
GARCH (1,1) process. The rest of the variables are defined as previously. The parameter cin reflects the
abnormal returns around the event and the parameter /in captures the event-induced residual variance. We
use the following statistics to account for the stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-
event periods:
test ¼P
N
i¼1
Sit
N
=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N N1ð Þ
P
N
i¼1
Si;t 
P
N
j¼1
Sj;t=N
 !2
v
u
u
t ; where Sit ¼ bcinﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bh2
in
q
where cin is the estimated mean abnormal return of security i on a given day or window and
ch2in is the
estimated standard deviation of the abnormal return on a given day (we use the average of ch2it when
abnormal returns are estimated over a window). The test statistic presented in Eq. (14) follows the Student
t-distribution with N - 1 degrees of freedom
***, ** and * Significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively
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should, therefore, improve the power and accuracy of the cross-sectional test statistic
presented in Eq. (12).
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. Panel A shows that the average ARs
and CARs following negative warnings are positive but not statistically significant (except
for CAR6). The paired t test and the non-parametric WSRT indicate that the ARs and
CARs in Panel A of Table 5 are in many cases significantly smaller in magnitude than their
market model counterparts (Panel A of Table 1). Panel B of Table 5 shows that the ARs
and CARs following positive warnings are small, but remain negatively significant. The
paired t test and the WSRT also suggest that the ARs and CARs in Panel B of Table 5 are
significantly smaller than those generated by the standard market model. Furthermore, the
ARs and CARs in Panel B of Table 5 are very similar in magnitude to those obtained using
Savickas’ model (Panel B of Table 4), implying that profits in excess of transaction costs
cannot be earned from the contrarian strategy.
In summary, the market model CARs suggest that investors overreact to both positive
and negative warnings. However, adjusting for the time-varying risk and the event-induced
variance causes the overreaction patterns following negative news to disappear completely.
These adjustments also cause abnormal returns on days ?1 and ?2 after positive warnings
to lose their statistical significant (see Sect. 3.3) and the magnitudes of the remaining post-
positive-warning CARs to decline to such an extent that a contrarian strategy does not earn
a profit in excess of transaction costs. These findings are consistent with the large body of
literature that posits that ignoring time-varying betas, the conditional heteroskedastic
behavior of the residual variance, and the event-induced volatility may yield biased market
model parameter estimates and inconsistent test statistics (e.g., Corhay and Tourani-Rad
1994; Brown et al. 1988; Savickas 2003; Kolari and Pynno¨nen 2010).
3.5 Multivariate analysis
So far, we have shown that incorporating the time-varying betas, event-induced variance
and conditional heteroskedasticity into the modelling process causes the overreaction
patterns after negative warnings to disappear completely. These adjustments also yield
smaller, and in some cases statistically insignificant, post-positive-warning CARs. How-
ever, the presence of some significantly negative, albeit small, post-positive-warning CARs
may still be used as an argument for the overreaction hypothesis. To verify the validity of
this claim, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression:
CARis ¼ /0 þ/1 AR0iþ
X
k
/ik Controlki þ IndustryDummiesþYearDummiesþ e; ð13Þ
where CARis is firm i’s average cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days
beginning 1 day after a positive warning; AR0i is firm i’s average event-day abnormal return
(both AR0i and CARis are adjusted for the time-varying betas, event-adjusted variance and
conditional heteroskedasticity);Controlki is a vector of control variables, which includes a set
of firm-specific variables that are deemed to influence stock returns. These variables include
the book-to-market ratio (BTMVi), the natural logarithm of stock i’s market capitalization
measure (lnMViÞ and the average turnover—i.e., the daily trading volume divided by the
number of shares outstanding (AvgTOi). BTMVi and lnMVi are measured 11 days prior to the
positive warning, while AvgTOi is computed over the [-105, -6] window prior to the
positive warning. Industry and year dummies are included to control for the industry and year
fixed effects. We also correct standard errors for firm-level clustering.
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Table 5 Price reaction to profit warnings: the role of event-induced variance, conditional heteroskedasticity
and time-varying betas
Conditional versus unconditional
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score
Panel A: Negative warnings
AR0 -3.46 -5.95 0.25 1.89*
AR1 0.44 1.11 -1.11 1.22
CAR 1;2½  0.28 -0.63 0.72 -0.12
CAR 1;3½  -0.04 -1.64 2.57** 1.32
CAR 1;4½  0.32 1.09 0.76 0.09
CAR 1;5½  0.00 -0.53 2.63*** 1.38
CAR 1;6½  0.23 2.14** 2.07** 0.82
CAR 1;7½  0.12 1.16 2.59*** 1.35
CAR 1;8½  0.16 0.10 2.53** 1.00
CAR 1;9½  0.10 1.16 3.00*** 1.72*
CAR 1;10½  0.05 0.30 2.89*** 1.75*
N 1238
Panel B: Positive warnings
AR0 3.88 4.19 0.14 -3.47***
AR1 -0.92 -1.79* 0.54 -4.00***
CAR 1;2½  -0.57 -2.23** -2.71*** -5.43***
CAR 1;3½  -0.34 -3.04*** -4.26*** -5.50***
CAR 1;4½  -0.15 -3.47*** -4.59*** -4.71***
CAR 1;5½  -0.09 -2.40** -5.36*** -5.74***
CAR 1;6½  -0.19 -3.77*** -5.30*** -6.27***
CAR 1;7½  -0.25 -4.96*** -5.17*** -6.12***
CAR 1;8½  -0.16 -3.73*** -5.74*** -6.56***
CAR 1;9½  -0.12 -3.14*** -6.29*** -6.93***
CAR 1;10½  -0.16 -4.35*** -6.07*** -6.76***
S. Yin et al.
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If the overreaction hypothesis holds, the parameter a1 in Eq. (13) will be negative and
significant, as the greater overreaction would lead to a greater correction (see, e.g., Cox and
Peterson, 1994; Choi and Jayaraman, 2009). Fama and French (1993, 1996) show that
BTMVi and lnMVi are amongst the key determinants of cross-sectional stock returns. If
smaller stocks reverse more than larger stocks, /2 is expected to be negative and signif-
icant (see, e.g., Bremer and Sweeney 1991). The parameter /3 is expected to be positive,
as investors may overreact to a greater extent when positive warnings are made by mature
firms than when they are made by growth firms.7 Finally, if the price reversal process is
caused by illiquidity, /4 is expected to be negative and significant (see, e.g., Choi and
Jayaraman 2009).
The results of the pooled OLS estimates are shown in Table 6. The coefficient a1 is
negative for all post-event CARs, but only significant in the case of CAR3. This evidence
contradicts the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis, which suggests that greater
overreaction causes greater correction. The results indicate that the post-positive-warning
price patterns are unlikely to be driven by the size effect, as the coefficient /2 carries a
positive, rather than the predicted negative, sign for all post-event CARs except for AR1
(significant at the 5% level) and CAR4 (statistically insignificant). The coefficient /3 is
generally negative, but only significant in the case of CAR4, which is too far from the event
date. This finding suggests that growth opportunities do not play a major role in deter-
mining the post-positive-warning price reversal patterns. Finally, /4 is negative, but not
statistically significant, indicating that the post-positive-warning price patterns cannot be
attributed to the illiquidity effect.
Table 5 continued
Conditional versus unconditional
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score
N 485
We allow the beta parameter in Savickas’ (2003) model to vary over time. Specifically, we estimate the
abnormal returns as follows:
Rit ¼ ai þ bitRmt þ cinDin þ eit; eitjXit1  N 0; h2it
 
h2it ¼ ui þ wih2it1 þ hie2it1 þ /inDin

where eit is a residual term, with a mean of zero and a time-varying variance h2it assumed to follow a
GARCH (1,1) process, bit is the time-varying beta estimated from the BEKK GARCH model, and the rest of
the variables are defined as previously. The parameter cin reflects the abnormal returns around the event and
the parameter /in captures the event-induced residual variance. We use the following statistics to account for
the stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-event periods:
test ¼P
N
i¼1
Sit
N
=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N N1ð Þ
P
N
i¼1
Si;t 
P
N
j¼1
Sj;t=N
 !2
v
u
u
t , where Sit ¼ bcinﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bh2
in
q
where cin is the estimated mean abnormal return of security i on a given day or window and
ch2in is the
estimated standard deviation of the abnormal return on a given day (we use the average of ch2it when
abnormal returns are estimated over a window). The test statistic presented in Eq. (14) follows the Student
t-distribution with N - 1 degrees of freedom
***, ** and * Significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively
7 The earnings of mature firms tend to be more stable and predictable than those of growth firms. Therefore,
investors’ surprise is likely to be greater when warnings are issued by mature firms.
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4 Robustness checks
4.1 Alternative estimations of time-varying betas
While the BEKK model has been widely used to estimate the conditional betas of the
market model (Tsui and Yu 1999; Choudhry 2005; Choudhry et al. 2010), a number of
other techniques have emerged for modelling and estimating time-varying betas.8 For
robustness purposes, we also estimate conditional betas using other popular members of
the multivariate GARCH (M-GARCH) model family. Following Faff et al. (2000), we
estimate a time series of conditional betas, bGit , for a stock i as
bGit ¼
qimrit
rmt
ð14Þ
where rit and rmt are the time-varying conditional variances for the stock and the market,
respectively, and qim is the covariance between the stock and the market returns, which is
assumed constant to overcome the onerous computational burden (see, e.g., Pagan 1996).
The time-varying conditional variances (rit and rmt) are initially modelled using the
standard GARCH (1,1) specification. Then, the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) of
Nelson (1991) and the Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) of Glosten et al. (1993) are
employed to model the asymmetry in the stock price volatility reaction to positive and
negative shocks. Following Faff et al. (2000), we also use the in-sample mean squared
error of forecasts, or MSEi ¼
P
Rit  Rit
 2
=T , to assess the accuracy of each forecasted
beta series (including those obtained using the BEKK model). Here, Rit are the predicted
values of stock i’s return series generated from the single index model with time-varying
betas generated from Eq. (14), and T is the number of days in the estimation period.
The GARCH-, TGARCH- and EGARCH-based time-varying beta estimates are pro-
vided in Panel A of Table 7. The time-varying betas from the standard GARCH model are
similar to those obtained from the BEKK model (see Table 2). Specifically, the GARCH
model indicates that stock betas increase in the aftermath of news, but the increase is more
pronounced following good than bad news. The TGARCH estimates suggest that stock
betas increase significantly after positive warnings, but exhibit no significant changes
following warnings containing negative news. The EGARCH model suggests that stock
betas do not exhibit any significant changes in the post-warning periods, irrespective of the
news contained in the warnings. Panel A of Table 7 also reports the average mean squared
errors (MSEs) associated with the different conditional beta estimates. It shows that the
post-negative-warning (post-positive-warning) average MSEs associated with the
GARCH- and TGARCH-based estimates are 12.54 9 10-4 and 12.53 9 10-4
(23.93 9 10-4 and 23.94 9 10-4), respectively. However, the EGARCH estimates gen-
erate average MSEs of 50.10 9 10-4 and 50.47 9 10-4 for the cases of negative and
positive warnings, respectively. This evidence suggests that GARCH and TGARCH esti-
mates provide relatively more accurate forecasts of time-varying betas than EGARCH.9 It
also implies that stock betas are more likely to exhibit significant increases after good news
than bad news.
8 See, for example, Faff et al. (2000) for a detailed review of these techniques.
9 The average MSEs from the BEKK model are 12.58 9 10-4 and 24.06 9 10-4 for the negative and
positive warnings, respectively. These figures are very close to those produced by the GARCH and
TGARCH methods, but deviate considerably from those generated by EGARCH.
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To gain further insight into whether the price patterns following warnings depend on the
way the conditional betas are estimated, we reestimate the ARs and CARs reported in
Table 3 using the procedure described in Sect. 3.2, but with time-varying betas generated
using the GARCH, TGARCH and EGARCH models, respectively. The results in Panel B
of Table 7 indicate that, despite some variations in the magnitude and the statistical sig-
nificance of the post-warning CARs, the general price patterns do not seem to depend on
how the conditional betas are estimated and are consistent with those outlined earlier (see
Sect. 3.2). Specifically, Panel B of Table 7 shows that the price reversal patterns following
negative profit warnings disappear (almost) completely when the betas are allowed to vary
over time. It also shows that, while the CARs following warnings containing good news
remain significantly negative, their values decline considerably once adjusted for the time-
varying betas.10
4.2 Subperiod analysis
Many studies suggest that the stock market is becoming more efficient over time (e.g.,
Sullivan et al., 1999) suggesting that the post-warning price patterns may also vary over
time. To test this prediction, we subdivide the sample into two subperiods: July 2007 to
July 2009 and August 2009 to July 2012.11 Table 8 presents the ARs and CARs from the
standard market model (Sect. 3.1), the market model with time-varying betas (Sect. 3.2),
the Savikas model (Sect. 3.3) and the Savikas model with time-varying betas (Sect. 3.4).
Panel A of Table 8 presents the post-negative-warning and post-positive-warning ARs and
CARs for the period from July 2007 to July 2009. The market model produces price
patterns that are consistent with the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis. Specifi-
cally, the market model CARs following negative shocks are positive and significant, with
an average CAR of 2.4% to be earned over the 10-day window following a negative
warning. Similarly, the post-positive-warning CARs are significantly negative, with a
contrarian strategy earning an average CAR of -4.1% over the 10-day window after the
announcement date. However, alternative abnormal return estimation methods imply that
the post-warning price patterns are likely to be due to a bad model problem. Specifically,
adjusting for the time-varying betas causes the post-negative-warning price patterns to
disappear completely and the magnitude of the post-positive-warning CARs to decline
considerably. The post-warning CARs become even smaller after the stochastic behavior
of volatility during both event and non-event periods have been accounted for. In partic-
ular, CARs from Savickas’ (2003) model are not significantly different from zero fol-
lowing warnings containing bad news, and are very small, and in many cases insignificant,
after warnings containing good news. The simultaneous adjustment for the time-varying
beta, event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity yields slightly smaller
CARs than the Savickas model.
The post-negative-warning and post-positive-warning ARs and CARs for the period
from August 2009 to July 2012 are presented in Panel B of Table 8. The results indicate
that the price patterns following warnings with bad news are consistent with the EMH,
irrespective of the abnormal return estimates. However, the post-positive-warning CARs
10 Note that we also repeat the analysis in Sect. 3.4 using time-varying beta estimates from GARCH,
TGARCH and EGARCH and our conclusions remain largely unchanged. Further details are available upon
request.
11 Subdividing the sample into three and four subperiods does not alter our main conclusions and the results
are available upon request.
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seem to depend largely on the estimation method. The market model CARs suggest that
investors overreact to warnings containing good news. Specifically, the post-positive-
warning market model CARs are significantly negative and increase monotonically from
CAR1 = -0.7% to CAR10 = -2.3%. The market model with time-varying betas gener-
ates similar results, but with slightly smaller post-positive-warning CARs
(CAR1 = -0.6% and CAR10 = -1.7%). The Savickas (2003) approach breaks the
monotonic abnormal return patterns, causing a large decline in the magnitude and the
disappearance of the statistical significance of some of the post-positive-warning CARs.
Similar results are obtained when the beta parameter in the Savickas model is allowed to
vary systematically over time. Specifically, on average, shorting a stock 1 day after a
positive warning and repurchasing it 10 days later would only yield an abnormal profit of
0.1%. This figure is considerably smaller than the average (median) relative bid-ask spread
of 2.75% (1.71%) associated with the sample stocks during this period, implying that the
contrarian strategy is not profitable after accounting for transaction costs.12
5 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of announcements containing profit warnings on the risk
and return characteristics of the underlying stocks. Our main purpose is to test whether the
price reaction anomalies around profit warnings survive adjustments for the time-varying
beta, event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity. The standard event study
methodology indicates the presence of strong price reversal patterns following both pos-
itive and negative warnings. Specifically, the abnormal returns are positive (negative) on
the days on which positive (negative) warnings are released and negative (positive) on the
subsequent days. These results are consistent with the findings of Lui et al. (2009), Bremer
and Sweeney (1991) and Atkins and Dyl (1990).
Several studies show that the betas and residual variances of individual stocks are
affected by the arrival of news (e.g., Brown et al. 1988; Grullon et al. 2005; DeAngelo
et al. 2006). Others find that the residual variance of the standard market model varies
systematically over time (see, e.g., Patell and Wolfson 1979; Kalay and Lowenstein 1985;
Kolari and Pynno¨nen 2010). This study shows that relaxing these assumptions results in
post-warning abnormal returns patterns that are largely consistent with the predictions of
the EMH.
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that, while the literature seems to produce
several price anomalies, the efficient market hypothesis should only be rejected if the
abnormal returns estimates survive stringent tests. Our conclusion is consistent with Park
(1995), who finds that the overreaction to large price change disappears after bid-ask
spread bounces are accounted for, and Fama (1998), who finds that most of the return
anomalies around corporate announcement events are mitigated with reasonable changes to
the way abnormal returns are measured.
12 We also stratify our sample stocks into different size and industry subsamples and our results remain
unchanged. Specifically, we show that the magnitude and statistical significance of CARs are highly sen-
sitive to the estimation method. While the standard market model results are in many cases consistent with
the predictions of the overreaction hypotheses, the price patterns obtained after accounting for the time-
varying betas, event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity are generally consistent with the
predictions of the EMH. Further details of these results are available upon request.
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